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Abstract
La tesi di laurea presentata si inserisce nell’ampio contesto della Sicurezza
Informatica, in particolare tratta il problema del testing dei sistemi di si-
curezza concepiti per contrapporsi alle odierne minacce: gli attacchi mirati
(Targeted Attacks) ed in generale le minacce avanzate persistenti (Advanced
Persistent Threats).
Il principale obiettivo del lavoro svolto è lo sviluppo e la discussione di una
metodologia di test per sistemi di sicurezza focalizzati su questo genere di
problemi. Le linee guida proposte hanno lo scopo di aiutare a colmare il di-
vario tra quello che viene testato e quello che in realtà deve essere affrontato
realmente.
Le attività svolte durante la preparazione della tesi sono state sia di tipo
teorico, per quanto concerne lo sviluppo di una metodologia per affrontare al
meglio il testing di sistemi di sicurezza a fronte di attacchi mirati, che ne di
tipo sperimentale in quanto si sono utilizzati tali concetti per lo svolgimento
di test su più strumenti di difesa in uno scenario d’interesse reale.
The submitted thesis treats topics of Computer Security, in particular it ad-
dresses the problem of testing security systems against nowadays advanced
threats: Targeted Attacks (TA) and Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) in
general.
The main objective of this thesis is the design of a meaningful test method
for modern threat defence tools and systems. The proposed methodology
aims to fill the gap between what is tested and what is actually tackled.
Activities performed during the course of the thesis are both theoretical, re-
garding the development of a methodology to better address the problem of
testing security tools against TAs, and experimental because the proposed
approach have been adopted in a real-world test session.

Introduction
The modern IT world is literally under the continuous assault of hidden
attackers, malicious softwares are built and diffused every day all around the
globe, malicious infrastructures are growing every day and more sophisticate
intrusion technologies are constantly emerging. But this is only the less
worrying part of the story.
Attackers evolved their strategies by blending them with military fash-
ioned modus operandi, the results are Targeted Attacks and Advances Per-
sistent Threats, threats highly focused on stealing intellectual propriety, in-
tercept communications and even disrupt physical assets. This represents
the nowadays security challenge for organizations all over the word.
Security industry started investing in products and technologies for fight
back modern advanced threats even cooperating with academic research
groups, a new generation of more sophisticated, intelligent, aware intrusion
detection systems and tools has born. Signature based era is over.
In few years, IT Security panorama has radically changed its aspect and
important issues have been raised, for example: “How to test modern secu-
rity products with respect to advanced threats?”[32]. Mayor industry players
and part of the InfoSec community are aware of the gap between what the
consolidated testing methodologies are able to test and the latest real-word
advanced threats to tackle. Old fashioned tests are no longer meaningful
when dealing with the nowadays threat landscape.
This work aims to investigate and propose a testing methodology for ad-
vanced threat prevention products and systems, always with Targeted Attack
in mind. Lower the gap between what is tested and what is actually tackled
is the main goal of this thesis.
Following chapters will firstly introduce the wide topic of cyder-attacks 1,
showing principal characteristics of modern threats, then will move on de-
tection systems 2 by reviewing taxonomies and by proposing a custom cat-
egorization that could provide a useful information base for designing tests
adopting the proposed methodology.
After this more theoretical review of the conceptual space of modern
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attacks and IDSs, the journey will proceed with an analysis of what is needed
in order to tackle modern threats 3 and a brief review of some cutting edge
technologies1 is reported. A quick summary of major test methodologies is
then performed and particular emphasis is posed on literature about security
systems testing 4.
Finally, I will introduce a testing methodology for targeted attacks pre-
vention products and systems, providing indications about how to deal with
every test phase 5. Then a real-world test using this methodology has been
described with emphasis on previously introduced workflow 6.
1At time of writing.
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Chapter 1
Cyber Attacks
Facing the non trivial task of testing security systems for detecting tar-
geted attack require a proper background about what a cyber attack is meant
to be, and about the reason this particular kind of attacks is qualified as “tar-
geted”.
In this chapter I will first provide a general background about cyber at-
tacks by describing how academy and industry define them through a review
of several taxonomies evolved toward computer era 1.1, once addressed this
preliminary issue I will focus on what an opportunistic attack and targeted
attacks are meant to be, with some notes about the origin of this class of at-
tack strategies1.21.3. Later, I will recap the differences between these attack
strategies1.4.
A brief overview on these topics is not only a matter of elegance and
completeness, it also plays a role during the analysis and the categorization
of detection systems, which is concerned with the proposed methodology.
1.1 Towards Cyber Attacks
The notion of cyber attack has assumed different flavors and several levels
of details along time, each definition is not a priori right or wrong, simply
they are placed at different abstraction levels and focused on distinct aspects.
Most of them specialize in aspects like attack results, attack process and
methods of operation[51], defenders point of view[50], another good part of
them show some kind of incompleteness when facing to more sophisticated
and modern attacks1. This simple fact is a clear indication of the non trivi-
ality of this topic.
1Taxonomies should be exhaustive, comprehensible, unambiguous, mutually exclusive,
useful
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In the following paragraphs I will focus on some key taxonomies which
may help to understand how the cyber attack topic has been treated since
the beginning and how it has evolved during the years. Also, I will take a
look at some taxonomies adopted in non academic environments.
Cyber Attacks in literature
Several taxonomies have been proposed since beginning of the information
age, most of them have a particular focus on certain aspects like attack re-
sults, attack process, methods of operation [51] , defenders point of view [50],
and more, but part of them show some kind of incompleteness when facing
to more sophisticated and modern attacks2. This simple fact is a clear indi-
cation of the non-triviality of this topic.
In [21, 3.3] was proposed a quite general classification based on the results
of the attacks. Three main classes are introduced:
Corruption which is any unauthorized modification of any kind of infor-
mation is the system, with or without the presence of a clear intent.
Leakage is meant to be any situation where information flows to places it’s
not supposed to go. This include both an error selecting email recipient
and information stealing performed by a malicious software(malware).
Denial is the failure to provide any kind of service which should be provided
accordingly to policies.
Obviously this kind of taxonomy offers only a primitive way to classify
attacks: it can only suggest some macro types of malicious actions that can
be useful in some limited contexts. For example, if we are dealing with a
generic malware this categorization could also be complete - in fact a mal-
ware may deny some services, can corrupt host configuration for ensuring its
persistence, and could leak information from the target - but it surely is not
mutually exclusive. Again, when thinking of a more complex and realistic
scenario, things quickly collapse: how do the information gathering phase
(eg. network scans) maps into this taxonomy? The answer is completely
subjective.
Years later a process oriented point of view [40, 6.4] based on the “means,
ways, and ends” operational sequence has been introduced. Here five orthog-
onal dimensions of this categorization:
2Taxonomies should be exhaustive, comprehensible, unambiguous, mutually exclusive,
useful
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Attacker try to model who is performing the malicious actions. But [36, 1.5]
reports that the proposed values for this dimension are not mutually
exclusive.
Tools one of the first attempts to distinguish between direct commands en-
tered by attacker, programs to automatically exploit vulnerabilities,
usage of autonomous agents (bots or malware in general), and dis-
tributed attacks.
Access describe what kind of vulnerability (design, implementation, config-
uration) have been exploited for gaining unauthorized access to pro-
cesses, files or data in transit.
Results this dimension is quite similar to that one introduced in the pre-
vious paragraph[21, 3.3]. Theft of service concept is introduced:
unauthorized use of a host or service without any kind of degradation.
Objectives some kind of main meta-goal of the attack. For instance polit-
ical gain, financial gain, damage or challenge.
However, despite the more complete approach, some key aspects of mod-
ern attacks will remain out of the model. For example, no sufficient emphasis
is posed types of malware used in the attack, or also there is no mention about
non-computer vulnerabilities (eg. social and organizational ones). Also, there
isn’t any reference to the attack phase detected. See section 1.3 for details.
A more modern re-visitation of [40] is proposed in [36], where the process
based approach is enhanced considering realistic case studies. The taxonomy
meta-model is composed of four dimensions sub-divisible in more levels:
Attack vector better care about tools used during attack. A multi level
approach ensure to better distinguish between different kind of viruses,
worms, or Trojan horses. Also the information gathering phase has
been introduced.
Target focuses on hardware components (disk, network equipment, key-
board, etc. . . ) and fine detail about involved software (eg. type of
application and version). But still missing is the presence of human
target.
Vulnerability focuses only on implementation, design, and configuration
issues.
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Payload or effects mainly the same of previous taxonomies (corruption,
disclosure, theft of service, denial) with better detail capabilities.
With this taxonomy some modern attacks (maybe the opportunistic ones)
can be effectively categorized, but is also clear that this model is not exhaus-
tive.
Recently, in [68], the approach on attack classification has been changed
quite radically. For example, in the AVOIDIT (Attack Vector, Operational
Impact, Defense, Information Impact, and Target) taxonomy a more flexible
tree structure has been introduced despite the previous list oriented ones.
The changes don’t involve only the structure of the taxonomy, also the
main point of view has been revisited, in fact the focus has moved on blended
attacks which may involve different techniques and steps within a single at-
tack attempt[19]. For instance an attack that involves both Trojan infection,
denial of service, and also the exploitation as a vector of infection.
As suggested by the acronym its main dimensions are:
Attack Vector which also include social engineering.
Operational Impact that also include a sub-tree about malware installa-
tion.
Defense distinguishing between mitigation or more complete remediations.
Informational Impact with in different flavors like:
• Distort, as information modification.
• Disrupt, as more fine grained form of Denial of Service.
• Destruct, information destruction like file removal.
• Disclosure, with emphasis on stolen informations.
• Discovery, with emphasis on scanning and fingerprinting.
Target Not only hardware and software target, but also users personal in-
formation.
A graphic representation of this more effective taxonomy is available in
fig.1.1.
Of course, this review is not exhaustive, in fact only some key-taxonomies
have been reported, further material and other reviews can be also found in
[57, 81, 37, 51, 50].
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Figure 1.1: AVOIDIT Taxonomy (from [68])
Cyber Attacks in industry
Academic research is not the only player in the IT Security word, it’s also
important to take a look at which cyber attack taxonomies are in use in the
more pragmatic Info-Sec industry and in the military environments.
A notable case is represented by ENISA (European Union Agency for Net-
work and Information Security) which suggest to use the taxonomy described
by Howard and Longstaff in the ’98 [41, 61]. In this taxonomy, there are three
main entities:
Event composed by two dimensions:
• Action Low level (malicious) action like scan, flood, steal, and so
on.
• Target HW or SW entity targeted (eg. user accounts, network,
process, etc. . . )
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Attack composed by events and three extra dimensions:
• Tool, like in [36, 1.5] there are user commands, scripts, tool-kits,
autonomous agents, information exchange tools, and others.
• Vulnerability implementation, configuration, design.
• Results same as [21, 3.3] plus theft of resource and increased access
(aka privilege escalation).
Incident composed by one or more attacks with two supplementary dimen-
sions:
• Attackers, as the type of attacker (hacker, spy, corporate raiders,
criminals, etc. . . )
• Objectives, like political gain, financial gain, damage or challenge.
As the reader can see, this taxonomy is based on the process oriented one
introduced in [40] and it’s surely capable to better fit the conceptual space
of a cyber attack, but still miss some key concepts of modern attacks, like
the nature of the tools used, and the possible human-nature of the targets.
In fig.1.1 shows a graphic representation of the taxonomy.
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Figure 1.2: Taxonomy suggested by ENISA (form [61])
Another non academic approach is one that emerged from military envi-
ronments, which surely are first class actors in the Info-Sec community.
Reading articles published since early 2k’s, is possible to discover really
interesting facts about cyber-warfare : strong similarities with modern cy-
ber attacks are observable.
For example in [47] - published in 2001 - a cyber-warfare taxonomy is
introduced with emphasis on the attack process:
Cyber warfare (CyW) act intended to compromise other nation will, exe-
cuted against software infrastructure.
Cyber infiltration (CyI) defence penetration.
Cyber manipulation (CyM) after infiltration, take control of the system.
Cyber assault (CyA) after infiltration, destruction of software and data,
damage system.
8 1. Cyber Attacks
Cyber raid (CyR) after infiltration, could result in data alteration, destruc-
tion or acquisition, leaves the system intact.
Cyber attack (CyA) CyI, CyM, CyA, or CyR.
Cyber crime (CyC) CyA without the intent to affect national security.
Looking at the description of modern cyber attacks in section 1.3, the
contribution of this kind of categorization results pretty evident.
Additionally, Info-Sec industry has also some de-facto standard like the
VERIS Framework [31]. This taxonomy is currently adopted by Verizon in
its annual Data Breach Investigations Report3, which represent an excellent
resource for reasoning about future trends of this sector. Over 19 of the major
Info-Sec companies cooperate with Verizon in order to provide information
about security breaches using a shared framework, easing further intelligence
and data analysis. This model is composed by six main dimensions:
• Demographics information
• Incident classifications, like type of attacker agent, action performed
on assets, assets, and assets attributes.
• Discovery and Mitigation, specifying time spans of major attack phases,
discovery method, evidences , and control measures.
• Impact classification, as direct impact (eg. lost assets), indirect impact
(eg. stakeholders reactions), impact estimation and qualification.
1.2 Opportunistic Attacks
Not every exploited systems have been attacked with a targeted strategy.
Often an attacker needs its own (illegal) infrastructure for further attacks
and search the Internet for vulnerable systems to take control of. Once
a vulnerability is discovered and exploited, the attacker may be interested
only in using the machine as a proxy for Spam, phishing or BotNet control.
In this scenario, the economic loss and recovery cost for the target is minimal
[17].
OAs attack vectors (means by which the attack is performed) may lack of
advanced social engineering, because the attacker doesn’t have nor is inter-
ested in specific information. A list of commonly used vector is the following
[22]:
3Published at http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/ at time of writing
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Email: in OAs, mails usually contain phishing links of commonly used web-
sites. Those links may stole password, download binaries or simply
validate the email address.
Message: similar to email, but using some chat-based protocols.
File Sharing: malicious software may be distributed by means of a sharing
system protocol.
Trojan: in addition to perform the expected functionality, softwares may
carry malicious code, such as a back-door.
Vulnerabilities: Internet services, anti-viruses, browsers, OSs and other
program that expose themselves to the Internet, may have vulnerabil-
ities capable of granting access to an attacker.
Passwords: although this can be considered a vulnerability itself, a weak
password is a standalone and easy-to-use vector. A weak password
can be broken regardless of any update or security system a sys-admin
could install.
OAs use these vectors in a fully automatized way. Phishing servers gen-
erate email, bots connect to chat services and scanners scan the network
for vulnerabilities and weak passwords. This is why the number of OAs is
enormous:
1. The Verizion data breach analysis[30] reports more than 70% of attacks
as OAs.
2. A Verizon analysis [44, 45, 46] says that, on average, a system on the
internet is scanned after 11 minutes from the connection.
3. Honeypots receive hundreds of thousands of new malicious samples
every day.
What makes an attack an OA, is the “non-targeted-target policy”. The
attacker selects the most general social engineering approach, the most vul-
nerable target of the internet, maximizing a profit over risk ratio. Among
millions of targets, a single secured system is not worth it, thus, the attacker
is not interested in exposing itself by repeatedly scans a server port. In [45]
it’s said that “97% of opportunistic attackers try one port and 81% send a
single packet”.
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1.2.1 Attacks using internet vulnerabilities
The pattern is simple: the attacker automatically scans known ports used
by login services (such as RDP or SSH), web administration pages or vulner-
able programs.
In [44], the author notes that the source port of the scans is not fully
random, but it’s often set to a value that may bypass some firewall. This
confirms the nature of the OAs: assuming the attacker has no knowledge
of the targeted system, the parameter allowed by the majority of generic
defense systems is used.
1.2.2 Attacks using malwares
In order to exploit common clients, the attacker usually writes a trojan by
inserting its malicious code inside a pseudo-working program (e.g. the newest
Super Video Converter from .donald to .goofy). Such types of malware don’t
requires advanced exploiting techniques, because the user is willing to grant
privileges of his own (for instance, by clicking Allow on the UAC prompt).
By generating new variants of the same malware and creating new tro-
jans, an attacker could infect lots of clients, creating its own botnet with a
minimal amount of work. Loosing a single bot is not a loss for the attacker,
because the infected machine isn’t the real target.
However, this approach is risky. Malicious software and phishing links are
distributed wildly, exposing to the world the attacker, its C&C (Command
and Control), the compromised domains and the method used to exploit the
system. Knowing that, the attacker may periodically check if its domains or
malware were discovered and act accordingly, by using a new compromised
domain or writing a new malware variant [72].
1.3 Targeted Attacks
A targeted attack strategy drives the attack through specific objectives
against a well defined target. In these scenarios, an attacker gathers public
and private information and design attack vectors to hit the target without
being detected.
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1.3.1 Attack phases model
At the turn of 21th century, cyber crime became acknowledged as a real
threat by governments. A new military doctrine was needed. In [47] a
military taxonomy for cyber crime acts is proposed:
Infiltration: during this stage, the attacker identifies all the system that
can be attacked, that is, every system that can accept external input.
That include physical and remote infiltration.
Manipulation: following infiltration, an attacker can alter the operation of
a system to do damage or to propagate the infection.
Assault: following infiltration, the attacker can destroy software and data
or disrupt other systems functionality.
Raid: following infiltration, the attacker can manipulate or acquire data and
vital information.
Despite the military terms, this taxonomy describes actions that occur
during TAs, being the target a military organization or not. In [42], Lock-
heed Martin company proposes a military-inspired intrusion kill chain, with
respect to computer network attack (CNA) or computer network espionage
(CNE). The model describes the stages the attacker must follow as a chain:
any deficiency will interrupt the entire process.
1. Reconnaissance: intelligence and information gathering phase.
2. Weaponization: create the malware and inject it in a weaponized
deliverable.
3. Delivery: transmission of the weapon by means of an attack vector.
4. Exploitation: the malware acts, exploiting the system and compro-
mising the machine.
5. Installation: the malware installs a RAT (remote access tool) or a
Backdoor to allow the attacker an access to the environment.
6. Command&Control: the malware establishes a connection to the
attacker C&C, getting ready to receive manual commands.
7. Actions on Objectives: the attacker takes actions to achieve his
objective.
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The model above (proposed in 2011) expands the cyber warfare taxon-
omy by focusing also on the necessary steps before infiltration and between
infiltration and attack. These steps need to be followed and offer the target
an opportunity to detect or disrupt the kill chain.
Once the infection is consolidated, an attacker can perform various actions
to reach its objective. In [76] a typical modus operandi is proposed, basing
on the result of various forensic investigations. Unlike the kill chain model,
the following phases are presented from the target point of view:
Incursion: in this phase the attacker attempts to penetrate a network.
Discovery: once inside, the attacker analyzes the network to spread the
infection and identify the real objective.
Capture: when a worthy computer is infected, the attacker installs an ad-
vanced RAT to improve the stealth capabilities.
Data Exfiltration: the attacker uses the RAT to stole documents, pass-
word, blueprints. The attacker can also use the advanced capabilities
to spread deeper into the network.
1.3.2 Information Gathering
A TA against an organization requires as much information as possible.
The intelligence is needed to create the right weapon, choose the correct
attack vector and which exploitation to use. Recon is the very first phase
and must not be detected by the target, since an early detection could warn
the target and disrupt the entire attack.
A list of critical information needed by the attacker could be[28]:
Employee’s personally identifiable information: phone numbers, ad-
dresses, biometric records and so forth can be used for the selection
of the right target and attack vector.
Network layouts: web and mails servers, their location, software version
and system fingerprints reveals necessary information for the exploita-
tion, installation and C&C phases.
Company files: reports, databases and source code, for instance, could re-
veal software and useful data.
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Company information: information such as partners, services, mergers
and acquisitions, facilities plants could delineate social engineering ap-
proach and attack vectors via physical infiltration.
Organizational information: for a successful social engineering attack and
in order to identify the correct target the attacker needs technical staff
and C-team names, organizational charts and corporate structure de-
tails.
Work interaction: emails content templates, inter-communication proto-
cols, security and authentication mechanisms are essential information
for the attack design.
Tons of public information can be obtained by searching in the em-
ployee’s social networks profiles, public calendar entries and via specific
Google searches. Private information can be harder to obtain and often
requires the use of social engineering and of search engine hacking[28], that
is, using search engines to find vulnerable web pages.
1.3.3 Infiltration
Infiltration is the macro-step that includes phases between recon and ac-
tion on the objective. In this phase, the attacker uses the available intelligence
to design the correct method to reach the objective. The first step is defining
the malware requirements, for each step of the reversed kill chain:
Actions: which action must be performed? Can they be automatized or
require constant control?
C&C: is a C&C required? Must the malware exchange data with the at-
tacker or not?
Installation: does the attack requires a backdoor or is it a one-shot attack?
Exploitation: which security system must the malware bypass? Are ad-
ministration privileges required?
Delivery: which is the right attack vector? Can be performed from a remote
location or requires physical contact?
Weaponization: which is the right deliverable to use?
If the intelligence is good enough, the result is malware able to exploit
and bypass the target defenses.
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1.4 Differences between OA e TA
Intent defines the attack strategy and threat[17].
An attacker could target a vulnerable resource to gain money and valuable
information. In such case, the target is chosen by searching for a known
security flaw without any a priori knowledge of the system infrastructure.
We call this kind of attacks opportunistic attacks (OA).
On the other hand, an attacker having a specific target to compromise
would behave in a totally different way. These attacks are designed to bypass
the target security systems, knowing the architecture and the infrastructure.
Moreover, the attacker may be authorized to access to a certain area, becom-
ing an inside threat. These attacks are called targeted attacks (TA).
TAs and OAs strategies imply a different intent, knowledge and work from
the attacker’s point of view and, more importantly, they require different
defence methods from the target side. TAs and OAs differ under multiple
aspect, even for the target point of view. The TA exploitation, unlike in
the OA scenario, is just the entry point of the attack on the target. The
attacker steals secrets and intellectual property and can remain undetected
for weeks[39]: the economic loss is much higher than having an infected
machine that acts as a spam proxy.
So, the skill level required is different. In TA the attacker must model its
strategy to bypass the target defenses. This implies extremely customized
malwares, targeted scans, policies exploiting and so forth. OAs, on the other
hand, is focused on easy, risk-less and vulnerable target using automatic
tools. This process requires a lower skill than designing TAs.
Another difference is the context itself. While an OA is usually performed
from a remote location on public server, a TA can exploit local information
and policies to bypass the security perimeter. BYOD (bring your own de-
vice), for instance, can expose the network to heavy security risks. Years ago,
workers carried their laptops able to connect to the enterprise network, but
with BYOD, the perimeter, the circle of thrust, is not defined anymore[75].
Since every personal device can be part of the network, a TA can be per-
formed by infecting an employee’s personal smartphone and thus gaining an
inside access.
Chapter 2
IDS and Taxonomies
The other piece of background needed regards IDSs. The proposed guide-
line treats this kind of objects, or at least a part of intrusion detection system
which also address targeted attacks.
In this chapter I will firstly review IDSs through an evolution of tax-
onomies over the latest years 2.1, providing a general and well-defined back-
ground. Then I will resume all the useful key aspects for the purposes of the
proposed guideline 2.2, specifying a custom taxonomy that will be used as
reference during the testing.
2.1 IDS in Literature
Since the first cyber attack notice, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)
have started a competitive co-evolution: more sophisticated attack led to
finer detection techniques and vice-versa. In the previous section I have re-
ported the evolution of cyber-attack through models developed in several
epochs and environments, now - for the sake of completeness - I am in-
troducing reference models, taxonomies and typical approaches in Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSs) development.
One of the first IDS model proposed dates back in 1987[27], it contains a
sufficient general description of the main component needed for this kind of
entities and provide some sort of architectural reference for future systems.
The model provide six main components:
Subjects as who interact with the system. Normally users.
Objects as resources handled by the target system. They can be files, de-
vices, connections, etc. . .
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Audit records records logged by the target system in response at some
subject action.
Profiles structure that characterize the behavior of a subject w.r.t. objects.
Anomaly records generated by IDS when some abnormal behavior is de-
tected.
Activity rules action to take in case of certain events, eg. anomaly detec-
tion, profile updated, rule update, and so on.
This general structure - or almost part of it - can be found in all current
IDSs. After a quick glance to a general IDS architecture, I am going to illus-
trate a non-exhaustive review of the main IDS taxonomies proposed in the
last decade. As for cyber attack, a clear taxonomy plays a really important
role during comparisons and further intelligence on collected data.
A notable work in the field of IDSs taxonomies has been published in
1999[26], the authors provided a basic reference on what kind of measure
perform on IDS in order to obtain soundness evaluation[26, 2.3]:
Accuracy the True Positive and True Negative rate.
Performance as the rate at which audit events are processed. Note that
this parameter is crucial in case of real-time detection.
Completeness the False Negative rate. This measure is really hard to
evaluate outside test-beds, because of the impossibility to have global
knowledge about attacks.
Fault tolerance how a IDS is capable to resist to attacks and failures.
Timeliness this measure the time needed for propagation of the result of
the analysis. Quicker propagation to security team lesser time for the
attack.
Aside for evaluation metrics, [26, 3] has introduced a really powerful
taxonomy based on IDS functionality:
Detection Method how detection is performed and which kind of model
are used.
• Knowledge based
• Behavior based
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Behaviour on Detection what the IDS does after a detection.
• Passive, reporting only.
• (Pro)Active, trying to stop attack.
Audit Source Location where IDS retrieves informations.
• Host Log events captured on host machine.
• Network using network sensors.
Usage Frequency how the IDS is meant to be used.
• Continuous monitoring
• Periodic analysis
One of the key aspects of this powerful taxonomy is the emphasis on
detection method, for this reason I consider useful spending few more words
about it:
Knowledge Based The main characteristic of this approach is to search
for evidence of attacks based on current knowledge. This is not only
the case of the classical, standard approach based on signature match-
ing used by the whole host-based Anti-Virus solutions, but also systems
that rely on some kind of expert system[26, 3.1.1.1], preconfigured rules,
or pattern matching too. These detection methodologies are all based
on previous knowledge, or previous known models (eg. Petri Nets[26,
3.1.1.3.]).
This family of detectors is known for its good accuracy and perfor-
mance, but it lacks in detecting non a-priori known attacks or attack
patterns.
Behaviour Based This kind of detectors starts with a completely different
assumption: alerts are generated by deviation from “normal” model of
behavior.
This means a behavioral approach requires a more sophisticated set-up,
and at least a non static, non a priori definition of “normal” behavior.
The conceptual gap between this approach w.r.t. knowledge based one
is in the capability of the system to dynamically learn what “normal”
behavior mean in the specific installation context.
However, “learn” does not mean it must only use machine learning
approaches, in [26, 3.1.2.1,3.1.2.2] are cited examples of behavioral IDSs
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based on statistics and even expert systems (using dynamic inference
rules).
Figure 2.1: Functional taxonomy of an IDS (form [26])
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Continuing on this line, an interesting work[70] has posed particular em-
phasis on the detection properties of the IDSs, in this article the authors have
proposed a taxonomy for detection principles keeping a functional point of
view, like in [26]. However, this taxonomy results interesting due to some
important details I will briefly discuss. First of all, are present three main
detection principles:
Anomaly based which involves some kind of behavioral analysis. A par-
ticular attention is posed on how the “normal” behavior model is gen-
erated, in fact two sub-categories are introduced:
• self-learning, citing approaches like artificial neural network (ANN),
rule modeling and descriptive statistics.
• programmed, using techniques like thresholds, state series model-
ing, simple rules, etc. . .
Signature based based on the knowledge of a model of attack, this kind
of IDSs can be programmed with a priori decision rules (eg. petri-net,
state transition, string matching, simple rules, etc. . . )
Signature inspired a miscellaneous category, where attack model are stronger
than normal behavior model. A self-learning approach is contemplated
for this kind of IDSs, for example an automatic feature selection may
change the weight of some detected events in order to increase accuracy
on the specific installation.
This description may be particularly useful for getting aware of which
kind of techniques can be used in order to develop a particular kind of IDS.
But the most interesting detail introduced is the intrusion categorization
from the IDS point of view: well known intrusions, generalisable in-
trusions, and unknown intrusions. Where these types of intrusion also
represent different levels of difficulty of the detection [70, 4.4.3]. This sub-
division is critical during IDS evaluation and may have heavy side effect on
the measured accuracy. For this reason mapping attacks in one of these class
could be really valuable.
An alternative taxonomy, described in [77], has a different focus w.r.t.
functional ones introduced above. The main idea of this work is to introduce
the concept of “intrusion matrix” as the combination of output produced by
the IDSs and the data scale used. The output produced by IDSs is mapped
five categories:
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Detection when the system outputs an indication of a state change within
a network or host with. Note that no classification about the nature of
the change is performed, there is only the assumption that the change
is related to an attack.
Recognition capability of the IDS to declare the type of attack (eg. DDoS,
privilege escalation, exploit, etc. . . )
Identification capability to identify the specific event. For example can
determine when an exploit is a stack overflow from heap overflow in a
particular application specific vulnerability.
Confirmation ability to react to the specific attack enforcing fine or coarse
grained countermeasures.
Prosecution capability to identify the attacker.
And the contemplated data scale are:
File monitoring individual files for changes or access.
Host monitoring application running on hosts.
Network monitoring network packets between hosts, servers, and other net-
work devices.
Enterprise monitoring traffic originated from trusted sources of an organi-
zation.
Also, this taxonomy may offer a direct visual representation of the foot-
print of real world IDSs. In figure 2.1 are shown several types of IDS which
can be currently deployed on organizations networks. Obviously this taxon-
omy offers a completely different - non-functional - point of view for IDSs
categorization.
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Figure 2.2: Footprint of IDSs using IDS matrix taxonomy (form [77])
2.2 Adopted Taxonomy
Every taxonomy cited in section 2.1 cover interesting aspects needed in
the proposed methodology[77, 70, 26], so I will not merely adopt one of them
for my purposes, I am going to define an ad hoc taxonomy where to map
targeted attack detection systems in order to:
• Properly classify the detection system under evaluation and identify
weakness and strengths of the adopted approaches and technologies.
• Provide a valid background information to develop the right tools for
testing the detection systems.
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The proposed taxonomy will focus on aspects like information sources,
detection approach, recognition capabilities, and reaction capabil-
ities. All these aspects are quite important in order to evaluate detection
systems that claims to be able to handle advanced, targeted, cyber attacks.
In detail the reference framework will be structured as follows:
Information Sources aims to define where detection system gather its in-
formation, and also what kind of data it treats. A first level subdivision
could be similar to that one described in [26, 3]: host based data sources
and network based data sources. Here I consider several capabilities
like:
• File system monitoring
• Registry and processes operation monitoring
• Host memory monitoring
• Access to network/host meta-data, like Network flows or SNMP
informations.
• Access to network data, full traffic captures.
• Access to application level data and/or meta-data (eg. http server
log or protocols understanding).
In other words, which kind data feeds the detection system.
Detection Approaches I firstly adopt a categorization similar to that one
proposed in [70], which may help to summarize how gathered data are
used in the detection process. Secondly technologies adopted in the
implementation of the system are concerned. In fact the type of the
technologies implemented may enhance detection capabilities despite
the limitations of the general approach of the system. In detail the
first level categories are:
• Anomaly based, when input data are processed in order to find
deviation from a “normal” behavior model. Typically self-learning
techniques and/or statistical models and rules are adopted during
this kind of approach.
• Knowledge based, when the detection is driven by direct knowledge
of the threat, by recognition of malicious patterns, or by knowl-
edge of application/protocol states flow or also predefined rules.
Typically this approach is focused on knowledge of intrusive be-
havior.
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• Hybrid, when both intrusive behaviour and normal behaviour knowl-
edge are used, hopefully outputting distinct alerts in order to prop-
erly weight the detection.
The list of technology types should not be defined in this phase due to
the high number of possibilities encountered in a real world scenario.
For this reason, here is reported a list of key features which should be
investigated when defining a technology type:
• Goal of the technology, what kind of problem it should solve, or
more specifically which kind of things it should detect.
• Mainstays, key features of the implementation and scenarios where
it can be useful.
• Limitations, when it may fail and how it can be bypassed by an
attacker.
So, in this part of the taxonomy detection approaches are addressed
via two different level of abstraction, an higher coarse grained one -
and also well discussed in literature - and another one much more fine
grained based on technological specification.
Recognition Capabilities the ability of the system to detect which kind
of threat has been detected, like Drive by Downloads, DoS, Malware
callbacks, Malware Downloads, and so on. The recognized events could
not be exhaustively listed because the type of anomaly detected could
be not only at technical level like cited ones, but also I concern higher
level recognitions like “infection”, “information gathering”, “data leak”
,or some other higher level states which may characterize attacks and
more specifically targeted attacks.
Reaction Capabilities how the system can counter-strike to the recog-
nized threat. Example of this kind of capabilities are “blocking”, “re-
porting”, “providing evidence”, . . . .
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Chapter 3
Defence Tools
In this chapter, the kinds of bullets needed to face the TA detection
challenge are briefly discussed. The main objectives of a defence system
able to deal with TAs is to detect unknown threats in order to block current
attacks and even block further intrusion attempts from the same attacker.
The following sections will show what kind of approaches are not optimal
for the TA detection purposes 3.1 and will point out to a holistic approach
which employ specific knowledge of the targeted attack kill chain 3.2.
Once discussed a possible defence approach, I will briefly describe which
kind of components/entities are useful for setting up a TA detection sys-
tem 3.3 and then I will review some of the latest solutions/products - both
open-source and commercial - that claim to deal with TAs and APTs 3.4 3.5,
mapping them in the taxonomy introduced in 2.2.
3.1 What does not work
In this section I’ll have some thought about TAs with respect to intrusion
detection systems, from both a theoretical/academic point of view and a more
pragmatical industry oriented one.
Theoretical point of view
The first thing to do for understanding what kind of thread are we facing,
is a modest abstraction work for finding a soundness mapping to one of the
model introduced in chapter 1.
Thinking about the difference between TA and OA discussed in section 1.4
the unknown nature of a TA become explicit: it depends on target defence
systems, policies, custom scans, and also involve some kind of ad-hoc mal-
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ware. So, following the taxonomy proposed in [70, 4.4.3], we are facing the
most difficult to detect type of intrusion possible. Having that mapping, then
we can review some of the most recent literature about the intrusion detec-
tion problem for understanding which kind of IDSs may better deal with this
kind of problems.
A recent IDS review [56], evaluate in depth the characteristics of a great
number of IDSs proposed during the last decade, mapping all of them in
a taxonomy really similar to those ones briefly discussed in section 2.1. In
this work exist three IDS types: signature based (knowledge based), anomaly
based (behaviour based), and also state-full protocol analysis based1 (specifi-
cation based). Main pros and cons of these intrusion detection types are the
following[56, Table 1]:
Knowledge
Based
Behaviour
Based
Specification
based
Pros Simpler, effec-
tive for known
attacks
Effective for un-
known attacks
Distinguish
unexpected
sequence of
commands
Cons Ineffective with
unknown at-
tacks, maintain-
ing knowledge is
time consuming
Profile accu-
racy, rebuilding
profiles
Resource con-
suming protocol
state tracing,
can’t inspect
attacks looking
like benign pro-
tocol behaviours
Table 3.1: Pros and cons of the three main types of IDS
Once accepted these two facts, is quite clear that the thread represented
by TAs can’t be faced with traditional countermeasures, which are com-
monly characterized by a signature, pattern based, state based, or in general
knowledge based approach.
Industry point of view
Nowadays, Info-Sec industry players seem to be pretty aware of of the
situation, in fact the term “Advanced Persistent Threat” is a live motif in
security communities, a simple research using Google (or similar) can clearly
1An IDS which knows how to trace protocols states and use network protocol models
for its detections.
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demonstrate it. Also, Anti-Virus (AV) industries perfectly know that signa-
ture based technologies are not enough from long time, different commercial
solutions plug “heuristic” based technologies, “behavioral” engines, or “cloud
intelligence” support [49, 14] to classical pattern matching engines. However,
even OAs have evolved during years by enhancing and automating evasion
capabilities[16, 2.2] even using third party services for generating new version
of the same executable [58], for this reason some interrogatives about what
does the industry word intend when talking about “heuristics”, “behavioral”,
and “intelligence” remain: taking a look to few AV company blogs[48, 71]
suggest that their main focus remain in OAs, so all these detection techniques
may be interpreted as oriented on generalization of known attacks/in-
trusions, which is not exactly an unknown attack.
AV industry apart, other technologies like Network Intrusion Detection
Systems (NIDS)[66], Firewalls and Proxies are almost standard equipment in
company networks for boundary definition, hardening and monitoring. How-
ever this kind of systems are typically based on preconfigured rules, pattern
matching, or also protocol state inspection, which are all techniques based on
knowledge (or almost all). Just for this reason these systems does not provide
adequate detection capabilities for unknown attacks, in addition consider the
BYOD issue reported in the previous section 1.4.
Having said that is pretty clear that further investigations should be
performed in order to assess the efficacy of defence systems and technologies
against TAs.
3.2 Defence Approaches
A general defence approach against TAs is the interaction between mul-
tiple security layer, called Multi-Level Defence. An individual security
system cannot stop a targeted attack, but their holistic union can provide
information useful for prevention and detection.
The effectiveness of the multi-level defence depends on the ability of or-
ganize, analyze and use information obtained by the various security layers,
therefore dynamic analysis assumes a leading role during the defence process.
Data sources are queried to extrapolate information that must be related to
an attack. The analysis process has not only to distinguish benign events
from malicious ones, but also to attribute information to the right attack. A
wrong or imprecise analysis could afflict correct prevention and detection [42].
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The multi-level defence is based on attack phase models (see section 1.3.1).
Phases model is an attempt to bind an event to a particular context, situ-
ating an information inside a bigger pattern so that the analyst can identify
the attack, the current phase and act accordingly.
Example: Intelligence-Driven Computer Network De-
fence
Lockheed Martin published a defense methodology[42] defining intelligence-
driven CND as a risk management strategy that addresses the threat com-
ponent of risk, incorporating analysis of adversaries, their capabilities, ob-
jectives, doctrine and limitations.
Briefly, the intelligence-driven CND uses the kill chain model (see sec-
tion 1.3.1) to analyze past and current intrusions, in order to create patterns
for every chain link of a specific intrusion campaign. By detecting and dis-
rupting a single link, the kill chain cannot proceed and the attacker must
change his strategies. If the defender evolves faster, the complexity and the
cost for the attacker grows.
The analysis is based on indicators, pieces of information that objectively
describe an intrusion. Indicators can be atomic, computed and behavioral.
Atomic indicators retain their meaning in the intrusion context, computed
indicators are derived from data involved in an incident and behavioral indi-
cators are collection of atomic and computer indicators, possibly quantified
and binded by combinatorial logical operator.
The analyst obtains indicators by analyzing tools logs and reports and he
matures them to create a pattern that can be used to match future activities.
The matched activity could reveal new information, that will be analyzed to
create new indicators to be added to the knowledge base.
Assuming that the indicator attribution is correct, the analyst can ana-
lyze the intrusion campaign, determining the TTP (Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures) of the intruders and even their intent. The difference with com-
mon intrusion response or detection systems, is that the intelligence-driven
CND tries to determinate how the intruders are performing the attacks and
not only what they are doing.
In February 2013, Lockheed Martin claimed to have successfully identi-
fied an intruder with valid credentials, using a multimillion-dollar framework
based on the Kill Chain model[38].
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In the VERIZION DATA BREACH INVESTIGATION 2013 [30], the team recom-
mends to focus on the kill-chain approach connected with the information
provided by the VERIS framework[31].
3.3 Technologies
As discussed above, an effective defence solution could be based on a
holistic approach which involves several types of security components and
different technologies. For this reason I will summarize what kind of entities
should be useful for the TA detection challenge.
3.3.1 Traditional Defence Tools
Of course a basic layer of classical tools is a must-have, in detail I refer
as “traditional tools” the following pieces of software:
• Anti-Virus software (signature-based)
• Firewall (level 3/4) and Next Generation Firewall (NGF)2
• Application Proxy, at least HTTP/HTTPS proxy
• and also Application Firewalls (eg. WAF)
3.3.2 Network/Host Probes
In order to deal with advanced threats like TAs a good practice is the
monitoring of crucial points of the enterprise network with probes, establish-
ing useful data sources, which are basilar for any further analysis. Probes are
an abstract concept which may be implemented in a huge amount of ways, an
ad hoc piece software, a third party product with the ability to report events,
network taps, application or operating system log daemons. The following
non-exhaustive list summarize what kind of data should be monitored by a
probe:
• Network Captures
• Contacted Hosts
• DNS request, network flows meta-data
2NGFs help to detect application-specific attacks, may integrate functionalities of clas-
sical signature based NIDS, could support SSH and SSL traffic inspection and provide
basic malware filtering
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• Received emails
• Web Application requests
• Artifacts accessed/modified by a host process (files, registry entries,
other processes)
• USB device activities
• . . .
Probes and sensors could not be raw data collectors only, higher level devices
like (H/N)IDS3[69, 3] can be included as “sensors” or “data source” with
respect to the whole system.
3.3.3 Sandbox
Sandboxes are key technologies in the more general malware detection
challenge, they can be informally defined as “a way to separating running
programs, contain their execution through a fully controllable environment”
and the good abstraction level of this definition may suggest wider applica-
tive domain than the malware detection one. Sandboxing solution may be
implemented via a rich set of techniques such as jails [64], virtualization and
emulation[80, 12], rule based execution[13, 17.2.2], and so on.
In this section I will focus on virtual machine and emulator based sand-
boxing technologies, which have gained a central role in malware dynamic
analysis automation and reached good maturity levels thanks to the interest
of the InfoSec community.
Dynamic analysis is intended to be an investigation of the behaviour of
a target binary at run-time, this analysis method is one of the principal
techniques adopted in malware analysis due to the constantly growing cost
of static analysis (ie. Reverse Engineering) caused by the increasing of the
usage of anti-reverse and AV-evasion technologies such as polymorphic and
metamorphic code, packers and custom virtual machines.
Stepping back to the more specific context of TA detection, dynamic
analysis of unknown binaries plays a first class role because the kind of threat
intended to block cannot be quickly detected via traditional approaches due
to:
3Host based Intrusion Detection System and Network Intrusion Detection System
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• possible use of the technologies listed above for customizing known mal-
ware (packer, VMs, metamorphism. . . )
• and possible unknown nature of the malware used in restricted attack
campaign.
Having said that is pretty clear that having behavioral data about binaries
and all executable artifacts in general may provide an useful information base
for an attack detection.
3.3.4 SIEM
Another component adopted in many APT detection solutions is the Se-
curity Information and Event Management (SIEM)[73]. In the holistic ap-
proach all the data gathered by probes, sandbox, and sensors in general
should be sent to this component which, if properly configured, has the ca-
pability to become “the central nervous system of a network”.
A SIEM technology may be configured and adopted by need, involving
types of information relevant for the purposes of its installation, for this rea-
son is quite common to find SIEM technologies both as stand-alone software
and also integrated in specific defence tools. The main goal of a this tech-
nology is to handle information about vulnerability management, intrusion
detection, asset security assessment, asset management, patch management,
configuration management, and incident response, and threat analysis.
The amount of information types cited above should immediately stimulate
a couple of issues in the reader mind, and consequentially should also suggest
why several SIEM solution are integrated in defence tools:
• First issue merely regards the amount of data treated by this kind of
systems which strongly brings to the fore the field of Big-Data Analy-
sis [78] which rigorously treat this kind of problems.
• Second, the different quality of the information and the number of
vendors and products capable to provide these kind of information is
not negligible. In fact interoperability and the definition of a common
ontology for SIEM technologies are some of the challenges addressed
by security community and government institution[62](eg. MITRE).
B.t.w. typical SIEM technology should support the following capabilities:
• Dashboards tools
• Alerting and reporting support
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• Retention if the data for a long term storage.
• Data aggregation and correlation.
• Support and aid forensic analysis by enabling smart navigation of the
data.
3.3.5 Computer Security Incident Response Team
Despite the non software nature of the CSIRT, it still remains a key com-
ponent of a holistic defence approach. The idea of an emergency response
team is not new at all, in fact a first formalization of this concept was firstly
developed and promoted through the CERT/CC (Computer Emergency Re-
sponse Team Coordination Center)[18] after the Morris Worm incident4 back
in 1988, and just a year later a worldwide community of emergency response
teams was established[34]. The acronym CSIRT has emerged due to a spe-
cialization of the IR-team in computer security incidents and for copyright
issues too.
A good place to start understanding CSIRT is the “CSIRT Handbook”[59]
which contains high level definitions and guidelines. It also provides general
indications for setting up and maintain a CSIRT, in brief:
• CSIRT macro types and missions, for example a Corporate CSIRTs
should focus threat minimization and intrusion containment missions.
• The relationship between CIRTs and the security team of the organiza-
tion, by generally describing how integration should take place and also
what kind of overlapping with IT security department is concerned.
• CSIRT services types:
– Reactive such has reporting of compromised hosts or vulnerability
assessment
– Proactive like network hardening and threat minimization.
– Security quality management services such as improvement of in-
ternal procedures or employee training.
However the handbook clearly warns the reader that definitions, services,
policies and procedure valid for a CSIRT are not likely to be appropriate for
another one[59, 2.1], so the authors do not recommend to blindly adopt their
guidelines.
4The Morris worm was the first worm distributed over the Internet, which was capable
to infect about 6000 computers, around the 10% of Internet population
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3.4 Open Source Tools
The following paragraphs will provide some more concrete examples of
software systems and solutions which can play a role in the TA detection
challenge, characteristics of the tools listed below are summarized using the
taxonomy introduced in 2.2. The list is not exhaustive.
3.4.1 Anubis Sandbox
Information
src.
Detection
appr.
Recognition
cap.
Reaction cap.
Executable files Anomaly based Malw. Down-
load
Report
Technologies Goal Mainstays Limitations
Anubis Sandbox Dynamic Analy-
sis
different file
formats and de-
tailed behaviour
log
sandbox detec-
tion techniques
may be adopted
(aka red pills)
Anubis Auto-
mated Cluster-
ing
Behaviour Clas-
sification
unsupervised
approach
based on sand-
box report
Table 3.2: Anubis[11, 12] (sandbox, malware detector) summary table
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3.4.2 Cuckoo Sandbox
Information
src.
Detection
appr.
Recognition
cap.
Reaction cap.
Executable files Hybrid Malw. Down-
load
Report
Technologies Goal Mainstays Limitations
YARA signa-
tures
Static Analysis ability to define
ad hoc pattern
knowledge/pattern
based
Virus Total inte-
gration
Static Analysis exploit AV-
industry knowl-
edge
knowledge/pattern
based
Table 3.3: Chuckoo Sandbox[67] (sandbox) summary table
3.4.3 Malheur
Information
src.
Detection
appr.
Recognition
cap.
Reaction cap.
dynamic analy-
sis report
Anomaly based Malw. Down-
load
Report
Technologies Goal Mainstays Limitations
Automatic
Analysis of Mal-
ware Behavior
Behaviour Clas-
sification
unsupervised
techniques,
clustering
rely on sandbox
reports, that can
be fooled
Table 3.4: Malheur [65](sandbox-report analyzer) summary table
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3.4.4 OSSIM
Information
src.
Detection
appr.
Recognition
cap.
Reaction cap.
traffic capt.,
alerts, events,
info, logs, rep-
utation data,
. . .
Hybrid - Reporting,
Alerts
Technologies Goal Mainstays Limitations
Security sensors
integration
Information
Correlation
arpwatch, open-
VAS, ntop,
NFDump, P0f
(fingerprinting),
Snort NIDS,
Suricata IPS
-
Table 3.5: OSSIM [3](SIEM) summary table
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3.5 Commercial Tools
The following list is a non-exhaustive list of commercial solutions which
explicitly claim to deal with APTs and TAs, other software exists, but no
review have been performed here because out of the purposes of this thesis.
3.5.1 FireEye Platform
Information
src.
Detection
appr.
Recognition
cap.
Reaction cap.
Traffic capt.,
Web objects,
Shares
Hybrid DriveBy, Call-
back, Infection,
Malw.Download,
0-Day
Host blocking,
Alert, Reporting
Technologies Goal Mainstays Limitations
Dynamic Threat
Intelligence
Information
Sharing
global threat
meta-data shar-
ing
-
Multi-Vector
Virtual Execu-
tion
Dynamic Analy-
sis
Multi-Path
technology[60]
for trigger-
ing hidden
behaviours
detection tech-
niques may
still exists (eg.
red-pills)
YARA rules cus-
tomization
Static Analysis fine grained
and customiz-
able signature
detection
knowledge/pattern
based
Table 3.6: FireEye Platform[33] (APT detection, SIEM, Sandbox, Network
Sensor) summary table
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3.5.2 LastLine Previct
Information
src.
Detection
appr.
Recognition
cap.
Reaction cap.
Traffic capt.,
Web objects,
mail, Shares,
reputation data
Hybrid DriveBy, Call-
back, Infection,
Malw.Download,
0-Day
Host blocking,
Alert, Report-
ing, Evidence
Technologies Goal Mainstays Limitations
Enhanced Anu-
bis Sandbox
Dynamic Anal-
ysis, Behaviour
Classification
sandboxing
and unsuper-
vised approach
for behaviour
classification
sandbox detec-
tion techniques
may be adopted
(aka red pills)
Bot Traffic
Analyzer[55, 43]
Botnet Detec-
tion
supervised
approach
performed dur-
ing sandboxed
execution, mali-
cious behaviour
may not be
triggered
Shellcode
analyzers[54]
Exploit detec-
tion
analysis and in-
strumentation of
several file types
-
DriveBy
analyzers[53, 52]
Exploit detec-
tion
sandboxing of
web resources
-
Table 3.7: LastLine Previct (APT detection, SIEM, Sandbox, Network Sen-
sor) summary table
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3.5.3 FortiGate
Information
src.
Detection
appr.
Recognition
cap.
Reaction cap.
traffic captures,
web objects, ap-
plication proto-
cols
Hybrid Malware Down-
loads, 0-Day
Drop malware,
Alert, Reporting
Technologies Goal Mainstays Limitations
FortiSandBox Dynamic analy-
sis
behavioural
analysis and
logging, able
to retrieve ob-
jects from SSL
connections
sandbox detec-
tion techniques
may be adopted
(aka red pills)
FortiGuard Information
Sharing
data gathered
worldwide
knowledge based
Table 3.8: FortiGate[35] (NGF, sandbox, network sensor, APT detection)
summary table
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3.5.4 SourceFire FireAMP
Information
src.
Detection
appr.
Recognition
cap.
Reaction cap.
traffic captures,
documents, rep-
utation data
Hybrid Malwr.Download Block host,
Alert, Report
Technologies Goal Mainstays Limitations
Cloud-based
Sandbox
Dynamic analy-
sis
behavioural
analysis and
logging, able
to retrieve ob-
jects from SSL
connections
sandbox detec-
tion techniques
may be adopted
(aka red pills)
Sourcefire VRT
(Vulnerability
Research Team)
Information
Sharing, CSIRT
Data gathered
worldwide, hu-
man analysts
are contempt
-
Table 3.9: SourceFire FireAMP [20](APT detection, SIEM, sensors, sand-
box) summary table
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3.5.5 WebSense Web Security Gateway
Information
src.
Detection
appr.
Recognition
cap.
Reaction cap.
network capt.,
web objects,
mail, reputation
data
Knowledge
based
Malwr.Download,
Dangerous Web
Page
Blocking traffic,
Reporting
Technologies Goal Mainstays Limitations
Websense ACE
(Advanced
Classification
Engine)
Threat Detec-
tion
classify binaries,
web pages and
mail, option-
ally support
sandboxing, ssl
inspection
based on knowl-
edge and sand-
box outcomes
Table 3.10: WebSense Web Security Gateway[79] (Advanced Web Proxy,
sandbox) summary table
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3.5.6 Damballa Failsafe
Information
src.
Detection
appr.
Recognition
cap.
Reaction cap.
network capt.,
web objects,
mail, reputation
data
Hybrid Malw.Download,
Callback, Infec-
tion
Alert, Reporting
Technologies Goal Mainstays Limitations
Behaviour-
basad Profilers
Botnet Detec-
tion
detect anomaly
in communi-
cations, fre-
quency anomaly,
p2p traffic,
anomalies after
downloads
-
Content-basad
Profilers
Botnet Detec-
tion
Sandboxing, AV
scanning, HTTP
request struc-
ture analysis[63]
encrypted traffic
may not be ana-
lyzed
Threat Intelli-
gence
Information
Sharing, Botnet
Detection
reputation
analysis of
destinations,
correlation with
behaviours
detected in
sandbox logs
knowledge based
Table 3.11: Damballa Failsafe[24] (APT detection, SIEM, Sandbox, Network
Sensor) summary table
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3.5.7 Symantec Endpoint Protection
Information
src.
Detection
appr.
Recognition
cap.
Reaction cap.
File and registry
activities, pro-
cess activities,
web objects
Hybrid Process block-
ing, Alert
Technologies Goal Mainstays Limitations
Symantec In-
sight
Dynamic Anal-
ysis, Behaviour
Classification
sandboxing new
binaries, classi-
fication based
on malicious
patterns
Knowledge/pattern
based
Symantec
SONAR
Dynamic Anal-
ysis, Behaviour
Classification
use reputation
information,
runtime be-
haviour mon-
itoring via
process instru-
mentation
Knowledge/pattern
based, may also
inject code into
monitored pro-
cess user-space
memory.
Table 3.12: Symantec Endpoint Protection (APT detection, behavioural AV)
summary table
Chapter 4
Testing Methodologies
Before introducing the guideline to test and compare APT and TA de-
tection solutions, I am going to discuss the methodological approaches to
software system testing. First of all I’ll review common testing methodolo-
gies in order to provide a clear conceptual testing framework introducing
best-practice and standard testing approaches which have been consolidated
during the years 4.1, then I will focus on testing of security systems, with
particular emphasis to the Anti-Virus solution testing.
Testing this kind of system is not trivial at all and both AV industry and
security community have spent lot of time and resources arguing about “how
to properly test AV solutions”: several independent third party testers exists
nowadays[23, 74, 29, 15] and also a standardization organization AMTSO
(Anti-Malware Testing Standard Organization) have been created. In sec-
tion 4.2 I will introduce principles, best practice, and also some of the latest
issues raised by security communities.
4.1 Software Systems Testing
Software security testing is not a trivial task at all, difficulties are not
strictly related to technicalities and “hackish-stuff”, sure they cannot be
liquidated as details or trivialities, but there are other less visible issues to
consider. Issues which may have heavy side effects on test results or even
damage system under test itself. For this reason a software system test should
be well-defined[1, 2.1] in several important aspects such as:
• Asset involved, limitations, and rules of engagement.
• Engagement zone, as the area around the asset involved, processes,
security mechanisms or services built around them.
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• Define vectors as the interaction between groups of assets (eg. be-
tween department A and department B) and which channels are used
in interactions (Human, Physical, Wireless, Data Network, . . . )
• Determine what you want to learn from test and choosing proper test
type.
The following paragraphs will briefly describe several common test types,
where the different level of awareness of both target and tester will lead to
the measure of distinct qualities of the target (and also of the tester too)[1,
2.3].
4.1.1 RedTeam Exercise
The tester engages the target with full knowledge of its processes and
security, but the target knows nothing of what, how, or when the test will be
performed. The true nature of this test is to audit the preparedness of the
target to unknown variables and vectors of agitation.
4.1.2 War Gaming
The tester engages the target with no prior knowledge of its defences,
assets, or channels. The target is prepared for the audit, knowing in advance
all the details of the audit. This kind of blind audit primarily tests the skills
of the tester. This is often referred as Ethical Hacking.
4.1.3 Black Box test
The tester engages the target with no prior knowledge of its defences,
assets, or channels. The target is not notified in advance of the scope of the
audit, the channels tested, or the test vectors. This audit (aka Double Blind)
tests the skills of the tester and the preparedness of the target to unknown
variables of agitation. Also known as Penetration test.
4.1.4 Crystal Box
The tester and the target are prepared for the audit, both knowing in
advance all the details of the audit. This tandem-audit tests the protection
and controls of the target. However, it cannot test the preparedness of the
target to unknown variables of agitation.
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4.1.5 Vulnerability Test
The tester engages the target with limited knowledge of its defences and
assets and full knowledge of channels. The target is prepared for the audit,
knowing in advance all the details of the audit. This audit (aka Gray Box)
tests the skills of the tester. The nature of the test is efficiency.
4.1.6 Double Gray Box
The tester engages the target with limited knowledge of its defences and
assets and full knowledge of channels. The target is notified in advance of
the scope and time frame of the audit but not the channels tested or the
test vectors. A double gray box audit tests the skills of the tester and the
target’s preparedness to unknown variables of agitation.
4.2 Security Systems Testing
After a brief review of the testing methodologies commonly adopted in
real-world software systems, I am going to focus on a more specific area of
the testing discipline: Security Systems Testing.
Typically, this area is populated with a various number of security re-
lated software and solutions, from the most classical Anti-Virus systems, to
Advanced Thread protection systems, through Firewalls, NIDSs, and IPSs.
The purposes of the tests performed over the years are several: performance
evaluation, especially in network based products, static file detection capabil-
ities, and also heuristic and behavioural detection capabilities (aka dynamic
tests)[23]. In the following paragraphs I will show how the industry-world
deal with this kind of test by reviewing guidelines, recommendation, and also
some of the most challenging issues recently raised by both companies and
standard organizations[32, 8]. Hopefully this may help the reader to place
the concepts introduced in following chapters in a more general context.
4.2.1 Anti-Virus and Anti-Malware Products Testing
One of the first kind of security systems which have been tested are Anti-
Virus solutions, this kind of test have been primarily driven by the AV in-
dustry, where numerous companies compete since the Internet boom. Tra-
ditionally AV products where tested in order to compare their performance
and their capability to statically detect malicious files and one of the most
typical standard sample used during the years is the EICAR TEST FILE [29]:
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X5O!P%@AP[4\PZX54(P^)7CC)7}$EICAR-STANDARD-ANTIVIRUS-TEST-FILE!$H+H*
This particular file is detected by almost all AV solutions and should trig-
ger an ad hoc message. EICAR test file has been firstly created for enabling
different kind of people to test AVs, finding valid malware samples in not
trivial at all and may lead to several issues discussed in 4.3.1, then to enable
users to check if their AV solution has been deployed correctly, and also for
avoiding legal restrictions which can be encountered in some countries for
the distribution of virus samples.
However, recent AV product tests have raised important issues regard the
use of EICAR test file for malware detection capabilities evaluation[25], in
fact the use of modified, obfuscated, packed version of the EICAR file led to
flawed test conclusion due to the wrong presumption that general detection
methodology can be deduced from the single case of EICAR detection: at
the EICAR conference 2010 disclosed test results shown that the only cases
where the test file have been correctly detected were when the file remained
intact. Such changes constitute a seriously unreliable guide to detection per-
formance and even worse, changes that “resemble” a malicious program has
no value for testing purposes unless they really are - in any meaningful sense
- malicious. For these reasons AMTSO (Anti-Malware Testing Standard Or-
ganization) suggest to consider the EICAR test file as “EICAR installation
check file”[10].
At this point is pretty clear that modern Anti-Virus and Anti-Malware
solution testing cannot be tackled with simple test files, a malicious program
sample-set should be adopted in this kind of tests. AMTSO suggest a best-
practice guideline[4] to inspire meaningful and valid test. It also explicates
that the static malicious file detection tests are no more the best approach
for testing security systems against modern threats and introduces/formalizes
the concept of dynamic test, where samples are actually executed. This
choice has drawbacks that should be handled carefully in order to avoid bias
in test results:
• The execution of malicious code should be controlled carefully.
• The performance of the product is strongly determined by the behaviour
of the sample.
• Sample behaviour is strongly determined by the execution environment.
Virtualization technologies adopted, network connectivity and malware
launch mode (eg. manual launch, drive by download, infected USB
disks, . . . ) may introduce bias.
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• Tester loose part of the control on the test due to possible interaction
with external - non controllable - resources.
• Test may loose part of its reproducibility
Also the nature of the “measures of success” of the test is discussed by
distinguishing between detection of the sample, removal of the threat,
persistence of the malware after reboot, and damage performed during
the test (eg. stolen or altered data). Some indications on dynamic test styles
are also provided, which are valuable methodological contribution even in
testing not only AV products:
One at time machines set up with a single product, the sample is intro-
duced in the environment and then executed. The state of the system
is monitored and analyzed in order to ascertain whether the malware
was detected (and eventually removed). After the test the machines are
restored to previous state and the test is repeated with next sample.
Many at time machines set up with a single product, but this time multiple
malware samples are executed at the same time. This kind of test is
more time-effective but also less precise.
4.2.2 Cloud-Based Products Testing
The review of defence tool discussed in 3.5 clearly shows an important
trend of the defence systems: the great part of the detection solutions con-
tempt a cloud based component on their architecture. This architectural de-
tail cannot be ignored in modern security solution testing due to the heavy
side effects it introduces in a testing session: first of all the strong depen-
dency of the systems under test to external resources lead to a severe lack of
reproducibility of the test itself.
Continuous updates, the reputation data, black-list, white-lists and threat
data correlation cannot be frozen during a test session, the tester cannot sim-
ply unplug the network cable because these features are required in order to
evaluate the security system at the maximum of its capabilities, for this rea-
son the tester should accept the loss of reproducibility introduced and tune-up
the testing methodology for ensuring a fair, unbiased test. Pragmatical clues
come from ATMSO[7], which suggest to:
• Perform tests of cloud-based products parallelly in order to minimize
the risk of a bias in favour of the last system under test.
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• Split test in several test-sessions for minimizing advant ages related to
the receiving of fresh updates of the slower detection system, in other
worlds the tester should try to ensure the similar condition to all the
evaluated products. Of course, this recommendation does not worth in
case of speed of detection or throughput performance evaluations.
• Carefully implement the “first do no harm” principle, in fact a too re-
strictive filtering of network traffic could debar both the functionalities
of the system under test and also the behaviour of the malware samples
producing biased test-results.
• Assess the performance of the internet connection and consider it as a
part of the the testing environment.
Network Based Products Testing
Some consideration could be performed even for network based products
like IDS, IPS and Next Generation Firewalls too. Tests on these categories
of system should be performed by considering both software functionalities
like the quality of the application protocols supported (HTTP, CIFS, SMB,
mail protocols, SSL, SSH, . . . ) and also hardware characteristics, in fact
deployment of these systems may affect the performance of entire parts of
the network, for these reason “stress tests” are welcome in order to assess
the efficacy of the solution under heavy loads.
4.3 Malicious Samples
A Few paragraphs above I discussed about the huge amount of details
that a tester should consider during a security product testing session, I
deliberately skipped the issues related to the sample-set adopted because
I think it’s a central point in the testing process, especially when dealing
with modern security solutions which claim to be able to counterstrike the
advanced attacks that characterize the modern threat landscape.
In previous chapters I have shown the main trends in underground mal-
ware development (continuous repacking, mutations, exploits, . . . ) and also
introduced issues regarding non-repeatability of a meaningful test, now I
am going to discuss the role of the sample selection in this delicate testing
process.
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4.3.1 Sample Selection and Validation
In [5, 9] the sample issue is treated with a particular emphasis on modern
system testing, these documents provide valuable guidelines regarding the
quality of samples, which is gaining a central role and sometimes is also
considered more important than the quantity. Quality of samples could be
reached by a proper sample selection process that can be summarized in three
macro phases:
Collection is the first problem that a tester will have to solve, in fact the
source of samples should be carefully chosen considering the designed
context of the test (corporate oriented or also consumer oriented). Also
is valuable to categorize samples from two different points of view:
• How and where the sample were collected, like honey-pots, crawlers,
ISP, malware collections, . . .
• Where the samples have been collected from, for instance it’s in-
teresting to know if a malware sample has been gathered from a
internet URI, a phishing email, file sharing platforms, social net-
works, intranet, . . .
However, the ideal source of samples should offer fresh, prevalent
and diverse real-world samples. The diversity of the samples should
minimize the bias introduced by a hypothetical specialization of a AV
company in dealing with some particular malware family, freshness will
help to better simulate a real-world scenario, where newly distributed
malware may be unforeseen, and prevalence should ensure to focus on
meaningful samples by controlling the amount of gray-ware samples,
that could trigger false positives.
Validation consists in a series of test performed on the samples. The goal of
this phase is to ensure the malicious nature of the samples which is not
trivial because a simple AV scanning test may not be reliable due to
the risk of erroneous detection produced by some too much aggressive
detection rule. For this reason different tools and approaches could be
adopted:
• Dynamic analysis of the sample by running it in sandboxes
• Monitoring execution using system tools, logs, rootkit and network
monitors.
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• Executing malware in a passive environment, then turn off and in-
vestigate difference between pre-execution system image and post-
execution image, searching for file system difference, boot sector
and registry modification.
• Reverse engineering the sample
• During 0-Day detection product testing ensure that exploit sample
works in target machines.
• Check the validity of the contacted URL at time of test.
Also the sample should be verified to be working in the testing envi-
ronment, a corrupted sample or a not loadable sample may spoil test
results.
Classification of the collected samples by labelling them as good, malicious,
or also gray when the maliciousness may depend on the intent of the
author or by the understanding of the target user.
Gray-Ware sample issues
Spyware, adware, toolbars and other unwanted software are commonly
referred as gray-ware due to the annoying nature of their purposes. Perfor-
mance of detection of this kind of software may vary from security solution
to security solution and is in general driven by the reputation assigned by
the security product developer rather than from detection capabilities.
For this reason evaluation of grayware detection performance should be
done with particular care to the target user perception of this kind of software
and should also consider geo-location of test scenario, for instance a false
positive detection on a chinese toolbar may not be critical meanwhile the
same false positive in a chinese testing scenario may be considered critical.
4.3.2 The Sample Creation Debate
From long time members of the anti malware community debate about
the creation of new sample for testing purposes. Argumentations does not
only regard drawbacks of the adoption of this kind of samples in a test session,
but also regards the nature of the concept of “sample creation”[8].
This issue could be addressed in a very philosophical way by firstly dis-
cussing about what kind of elements are required for identifying a new version
of a malicious program, it may seem trivial but the first impression could be
faulty because different point of view and abstraction levels can be legiti-
mately adopted to distinguish malicious programs. For example considering
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the inference “Executable bytes and binary instruction are changed, this im-
plies the existence of a new variant of the same malware” in the context of a
packed malware is correct, but is also correct to say “Malware is more than
a sequence of instruction”. It depends on the features you want to describe.
Creation may be achieved in different ways, even the use of compressed
archives, self-extracting archives and installers could be considered a sort of
sample creation, in fact these kind of technologies may add functionalities
to the malware itself. For example the use of a silent installer software may
help to keep infection persistent despite the lack of this feature inside the
real malware payload, or also a self extracting archive could be able to copy
malware in specific locations and create links to the extracted file. All these
features can be added without a real modification of the malware payload it-
self. Analogous consideration could be performed when dealing with packers
and virtual machines: they typically add anti-reverse, anti-debug, anti-dump
features to the malware. Creation also happens when the malware sample
is generated using a malware generation kit, extremely common tool in real-
world attacks. This enables testers to generate arbitrary malware variants.
Of course, writing new samples using previously known and unknown tech-
niques is also a sample creation case.
No official position about the sample creation practice has been taken by
the anti-malware community, for this reason I will report here some of the
key discussion about the motivations of this particular testing practice:
Testing Heuristic/Proactive capabilities without signatures is an im-
portant aspect claimed by several anti-malware solution and its testing
is obviously valuable. In this context, sample creation may be used for
guaranteeing there is no signature involved in the detection, permitting
the tester to focus on other detection capabilities. Nevertheless, part
of the anti-malware community advice to use fresh samples from the
field because they better represent the real-world trends in malware
development.
Test support for specific packers tester may decide to pack known mal-
ware payloads with a particular kind of packers in order to assess how
the anti-malware product handle this threat. Again part of the com-
munity continue suggesting to use fresh samples packed with packers
beyond question, but this time the gathering of specifically packed sam-
ples may not be easy.
Keep test focused Focusing a test on certain type of threat may be eased
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by the adoption of created sampled, especially when dealing with sys-
tems which claims to deal with a particular kind of threats due to
possible difficulties in gathering different samples of the same type.
Improving independence Samples used during tests may be known to
some vendors even without any maliciousness. If the source of the
samples is shared between both testers and one of the anti-malware
companies involved in the test a bias on result could be introduced. In
this context, creation of samples may help tester to gain independence
with respect to tested companies. The part of the anti-malware com-
munity which disagree with sample creation suggest to obtain samples
from independent third-parties, but this may not solve the problem
because same third parties shall be used by anti-malware companies
too.
Chapter 5
TA Detection System Testing
In this chapter I will introduce a guideline for testing security systems
with particular attention to their capabilities to detect targeted attacks, typ-
ically characterized by the unknown nature of the intrusion. The nature
of the threat suggests to keep the inspiration from Double Gray Box test-
ing methodology in order to sense the preparedness to unknown variables of
agitation.
Advanced malware detection does not exhaust the conceptual domain
of the TA detection, despite it represents an important part of this type of
attacks, other aspects should be evaluated in order to perform a complete test
of a TA defence system as the reconnaissance detection, or also the command
and control communication detection.
For this reason the TA kill-chain introduced in 1.3 is considered as main
track to follow in this methodology: TA kill-chain is an attack oriented model
which define what kind of actions are required in order to achieve a successful
intrusion, looking at this model from a defense oriented point of view pro-
vide valuable indications about how to define and design test sessions, so an
exhaustive test on security systems that claim to be able to tackle TA should
cover all main attack steps reported by the kill-chain model.
Vision
The reader must always remember what is the main vision of this test
methodology: testing for real, modern threats.
This can be better achieved adopting real-world test-bed environment
that permits to not just evaluate the efficacy of the detection in realistic
conditions, but also the scalability of the system under test w.r.t. realistic
workloads. Obviously, test-bed deployment requires more efforts and care.
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5.1 Testing the kill-chain
Having said that, is clear the whole test could be split in several sub-
tests, each one with distinct purposes, for example the reconnaissance sub-
test should be designed for assessing the capability of the security system
to detect anomalies related to the information gathering phase of the attack
(eg. network scan, web resources scraping, or other suspicious almost-legal
activities) meanwhile the malware delivery sub-test should be focused on
detection of weaponized malware. Following paragraphs provide valuable
references for setting up meaningful sub-tests in order to cover major steps
of the attack model.
5.1.1 Information Gathering
The retrieval of information about the target is one of the mainstays of a
modern targeted intrusion, the capability to detect attack attempts in their
earliest phase is really valuable because it should bring target organization
to an alert status, minimizing both the risk of a successful attack and the
time available to the attacker for performing malicious actions.
Testing products contextually to the reconnaissance attack phase is not
trivial and require a proper definition of the concept of “Samples”, test de-
signer should no more intend it as “malicious executables file” or “artifacts”
in general, he/she has to go back to a more abstract definition, treat it as
“a subset of a population” and then investigate what kind of population is
involved and how to define a meaningful sample in the information gathering
context.
An hypothetical sub-test aiming to measure reconnaissance detection per-
formance could involve network monitoring products or even web analytics
solutions accompanied with some detection engine. In this case, meaningful
samples could be defined as network traffic samples where benign sam-
ples are obtained by replaying known neutral traffic or generated using traf-
fic models [2][4], meanwhile malicious ones may be generated by effectively
gather sensitive information from the test-bed, for example by scraping web
resources or fingerprinting network devices.
5.1.2 Weapons Delivery and C2
Delivering malware is a crucial point in the TA model, this attack step
could decree the success or the failure of the attack attempt. For this rea-
son, assessing the performance of the detection of advanced, customized and
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weaponized malware may represent the core of the test . This part of the
test should be designed with TA in mind, trying to define meaningful samples
for measuring performance against targeted-malware. Tester should ensure
to collect good quality samples, trying as hard as possible to prepare a set
of samples not previously known to the detection system.
Malware delivery detection can be interpreted as the detection of the act
of spreading malware with the purpose of compromise hosts inside target
network, delivery may happen via several distinct vectors : some of them are
observable via network monitoring, like drive by downloads, phishing emails
or also misleading executables, other may not require network interactions,
like USB sticks, and also vectors involving observable channels exploited in
time and places where no monitoring is possible, perfectly reasonable as-
sumption especially considering BYOD diffusion and external contractors.
The possibility of unobservable delivery in a real-world scenario suggest
the tester to include sample execution in test session, this way outcomes
of the test will provide feedbacks on detection system capabilities to detect
command and control channels established by the malicious samples. Note
that the channel establishment introduce non-reproducibility in the test ses-
sion due to dependencies from uncontrolled external resources, for this reason
the sample selection must be performed carefully and a functionality check
of samples must be performed right before test session start.
Summing up, a test session designed to measure detection of weapon
delivery has to contempt dynamic testing of carefully selected, recently val-
idated samples, no particular constraint about sample execution scheme -
one at time , many at time - but as reported in 4.2.1, tester should be
aware of the likelihood of interferences between samples during a multiple
execution.
Testing the Unknown
Selecting samples accordingly to the goal of this sub-test is not trivial. By
definition a targeted attack involves advanced, sophisticated and customized
malware and concept of new/unforeseen/unknown is intrinsic when the
goal testing systems against TAs or APTs. At this point Sample Creation
should be seriously considered in order to better test systems with respect
to TAs. For this reason the sample-set may include fresh, unforeseen vari-
ants/builds of known malware families, customized malware generated using
bot-kits, and also ad hoc malware developed for testing purposes.
Particular attention must be paid when creating ad hoc samples because
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they have not to resemble a malware, they have to implement features which
potentially enable them to take control of the infected machine. Evasion
techniques are also one of the mainstays of modern malware, so a test designer
which decide to create samples should consider to equip them with this kind
of technologies.
Creating ad hoc samples inevitably require more skills and efforts to the
tester, but also helps to increase the reproducibility of the test by elim-
inating external, uncontrollable factors in favor to the adoption of fully con-
trollable objects, sensibly lowering the risk of violation of the “do not harm”
principle.
5.1.3 Actions
Actions and lateral movements performed by the attacker after a success-
ful infection are typical during a targeted attack and their detection represent
the last opportunity to stop the attack attempt before the actual damage.
Setting up a meaningful test for measuring detection performance of this par-
ticular attack step could be harder than expected because malicious actions
can be performed even with legit and native tools.
A brief categorization of this kind of actions with some examples of tool-
s/artifacts that could be involved:
• Local Actions software and commands run in a host, eg. cmd.exe,
reg.exe, at.exe, psexec, bitsadmin, netstat, any other program used in
a production environment, or also local resources accessed like files,
folders and USB devices.
• Network Actions like network-share access, remote desktop sessions,
telnet sessions, network scans, arp spoofing, ftp sessions, intra-net ser-
vices sessions, mail service access,. . .
This represents the population where to pick samples. A malicious sample
could be defined as sequence of actions that can be manually or au-
tomatically performed by an attacker with explicit malicious intent, here
the tester should have a clear idea of the meaning of the sample he/she is
defining and should also be aware of post-exploitation and lateral movements
patterns and objectives.
Defining benign samples can be even more challenging because a “benign
sequence of actions” is strictly related to the role of the host : running
netstat or psexec tools on the sys-admin machine is more likely to be legit
than running them on a clerk’s one. For this reason tester must carefully
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define the context - hopefully accordingly to the expectation formulated after
the analysis of the products involved 5.2 - of the test and may also decide to
adopt real users for producing real benign samples.
5.2 Testing Apples to Apples
According to AMTSO principles[6] particular attention should be paid
when defining test session to the type of security solution considered, it mat-
ter and must be properly evaluated in order to avoid irrelevant, misleading
test session like testing malware detection technologies in the context of in-
formation gathering. For this reason, in case of testing single specialized
products the whole killchain test should be reduced and focused on sub-test
related to part of the attack model concerned with the object under test.
In this context expectations regarding the security solution should be
investigated and defined: in other words a preliminary analysis of the prod-
ucts must be performed in order to enable or disable proper sub-tests and
figure out what kind of channels and artifacts can be analyzed.
5.3 Testing Systems
As seen in 3.2 a working approach for TA detection is the holistic one.
It is characterized by the adoption of several security products from distinct
vendors, or also from the same vendor, so concerning the case of a vendor
providing both specialized security tools and integrated solution using all of
them is perfectly sound.
For this reason the testing methodology must also support scenarios where
a suite of product is adopted by moving the test goal from “test TA detection
product” to “test TA detection system”, the results of the test designed for
the latter goal reveals useful measurement of the effectiveness of the detection
system composed by the union of products involved in the test.
When espousing this goal, single products’ performance will contribute
to the performance of the whole TA detection system, which is object under
test. However, when testing systems composed of different component, test
designer must also ensure to be able to monitor performance of each part
involved and should be able to attribute a Pass/Fail/NA judgment for each
component deployed.
Valuable information may emerge observing components results in rela-
tion to their expectations. A not applicable (NA) judgment may help to avoid
result bias during sub-test where the particular configuration of the system
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does not make possible to determine the performance of a component. A
basic example scenario could be a system composed by two components in
cascade where a benign sample is erroneous blocked by the first one, prevent-
ing the second one to analyze it.
Nature of Tested Objects
A well-designed TA system test must consider main characteristics of
the object under test, security systems have become more sophisticated and
complex, as briefly reported in 3.3 cutting edge technologies frequently rely on
cloud based, global wide intelligence support forcefully bringing the Internet
inside test-beds. Inevitably the test reproducibility is affected and test
timing become really important in order to avoid result biases.
5.4 Benchmarking
Comparison between products and solutions is one of the main motiva-
tions of real world test sessions and a complete testing methodology must
properly tackle comparative tests. According to previous considerations
about the nature of objects under test, test session must be performed at
the same time for each TA detection system/technology.
This design constraint has important side effects during test-bed de-
sign and setup, in fact setting up an unbiased test-bed will require further
efforts: test-bed designers must ensure that each system deployed in the
test-bed will receive the same stimuli during the session, roughly speaking
they should be potentially able to percept “the same things”. Not trivial
at all when the TA detection systems compared are composed by several
interacting parts, each one with different deployment requirement. Thinking
at test scenarios involving products with reaction capabilities clearly raise
the problem of interference between systems. For example consider the
following scenario:
• Tested products are network based
• One of the them try to terminate suspicions network flows in a reactive
manner, for example by flooding infected machine with forged TCP
RST segments after its detection.
• The detection capabilities of this “reactive product” are less effective
than other ones but its average detection/reaction time is lesser that
others, formally:
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detectreactive(samples) ⊂ detectother(samples) ,
s ∈ samples ,
‖neededStimululireactive(s)‖ < ‖neededStimululiother(s)‖
Where detectsystem(samples) is the set of malicious samples detected
by a system under test, ‖neededStimululisystem(sample)‖ represent the
amount of stimuli needed in order to take a decision about the current
malicious sample
With this assumption the “reactive product” could interfere with the
other ones avoiding further stimuli to reach other products, preventing them
from correctly detect the malicious activity even if their real detection ca-
pabilities are more effective. Completely different story if the test designer
is highly interested in performance, he could explicitly decide to consider
delays equivalent to a failed detection, here this kind of interference between
systems can be considered negligible.
Having said that is pretty clear that interference between systems should
be carefully investigated and successively evaluated accordingly to the test
goal.
5.5 The Whole Picture
The diagram in figure 5.5 represents the workflow of the TA detection
system test guideline discussed in previous sections adding emphasis on the
relationship between activities and artifacts.
Five principal macro-activities emerge from the description of the method-
ology already discussed:
Preliminary Activities investigation of the features of the systems, with
the goal to provide expectations about what should be detected and
indications about what kind of test perform.
Samples Activities providing a sample set according to expectations, al-
ways considering the peculiarities of targeted attacks.
Test-bed Activities setting up test-bed according to expectations and in-
vestigating possible interferences between systems.
Test Activities run test using provided samples and monitor performance
of each component of the systems, provide a Pass/Fail/NA result for
each sub-test performed.
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Result Analysis Activities Evaluate results and formulate considerations
about performance of the systems and contribution of each component.
According to these macro-activities is possible to define four test teams:
Analysis team in charge of preliminary and result analysis activities.
Sample team in charge of sample related activities, may help the Test team
during functionality check of the samples.
Test-bed team in charge of designing and deploying systems and test en-
vironment.
Test team in charge of running sub-tests with respect to timing constraints
and monitor each component of the systems.
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Figure 5.1: Diagram representing activities and artifacts in the proposed
methodology
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Chapter 6
Case Study: Testing Two TA
Detection Systems
Part of the work of this thesis regarded the set-up of a comparative test
of two TA detection systems adopting the methodology introduced in chap-
ter 5. The performed tests will be described with emphasis on activities and
artifacts that characterize the proposed methodology.
6.1 Preliminary Analysis
In this context analysis-team firstly reviewed systems under test and then
report that all of them are composed of the following types of defence tools:
“Next Generation Firewall”, “Advanced Application Proxy”, “APT Detec-
tion Product”1. Despite the similar architecture, different APT detection
products characterize these two configurations.
External connection should be concerned in test-bed design due to the
strong dependencies of the components from cloud-based resources, another
constraint emerged from this consideration regards the timing of the test:
test-bed team must ensure to design the test-bed in order to enable the test
team to perform required test sessions at the same time for each system un-
der test.
In the following section the first TA detection will be referred as SYSTEM-
1, the other as SYSTEM-2, next generation firewall as NGF, advanced
application proxy as APROXY, APT-DET-1 APT detection product in
SYSTEM-1 and APT-DET-2 for the other one.
1The reader can refer to tools reviewed in 3.3.
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Expectations
Preliminary analysis performed by analysis-team was based on the fea-
tures of the components emerged after their categorization through the tax-
onomy described in chapter 2.2: both systems should be able to properly de-
tect malware downloads, drive-by-downloads and malicious communications
with particular emphasis on HTTP based communications, for this reason
the sample-team and test-team will have to focus on this kind of channel.
Another consideration regards which kind of sub-tests perform: systems
under test do not cover all attack steps typical of TAs, for this reason we
limit our test to the malware delivery and command and control sub-test.
6.2 Test-Bed
Test-bed team deployed the systems in an enterprise context where over
a thousand of benign/sane hosts were performing their common operations
ensuring an absolutely realistic test-bed. In figure 6.2 is represented the
network architecture adopted for the comparison test.
Figure 6.1: Network architecture of the deployed test bed.
Interferences
During the deployment of the systems, test-bed team payed particular
attention regards possible interferences between APT-DET-1 and APT-
DET-2, they both contempt the possibility to activate reactive countermea-
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sures such as connection reset, for this reason both product configurations
deployed and network architecture adopted have been studied in order to
avoid interferences by disabling features and working with mirrored traffic.
Another issue raised from test-bed team regards the blocking capabilities
of both the NGF and the APROXY components, which should be concerned
by test team during their measurement.
6.3 Samples
Sample team decided to prepare the sample set using both collected sam-
ples and ad hoc created samples.
6.3.1 Collected Samples
Meaningful malicious samples cannot be gathered from malware collec-
tions for two principal reasons: consolidated knowledge of the sample from
AV industry and the high risk of sink-holed/not-working command and con-
trol services. For these reason sample team decided to collect samples directly
from their distribution sites.
After a brief analysis of the life-cycle of malware gathered from distribu-
tion sites, sample-team estimated a delay of about one working day between
the first seen of a malicious executable and the its “signaturization” by AV-
Industry. During this time span the sample could be considered new/un-
known/unforeseen.
Maintaining a sample set of unknown samples is not trivial because of
the limited amount of time needed for its usage, for this reason a two phase
sample collection strategy has been adopted:
1. Same week of the test day:
• Collect samples from distribution sites.
• Validate samples and conserve most interesting ones.
• Take note of samples metadata like file name or icon .
2. Few hours before test:
• Collect latest samples from distribution sites.
• Search executables with similar metadata to the samples previ-
ously gathered, eg. matching icon , similar names, . . .
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• Quick re-validation of the samples in order to check their func-
tionalities.
Modern malware heavily use polymorphism and metamorphism and new
different versions of the executables are packed every day, but an attack cam-
paign from the same “authors” last longer and other features like metadata
and icons do not change too much. This fact provides a valuable help in re-
ducing the search space associated to the attempt to figure out if the sample
under analysis belong to the same family of others previously collected.
At the end of the collection activities the sample set was composed of
5 types of malicious program - Bot, Trojan-Spyware, Downloader, Worm,
Trojan-Backdoor - grayware software and benign executables.
Validation
Collected samples have been validated using the following procedure:
1. Automated dynamic analysis via Sandox technologies.
2. Monitoring network, file-system and registry activities during a manual
infection session on virtual machine.
3. Outcome interpretation and attribution to generic malware family.
A complete reverse engineering have been discarded because of the non
reasonable time needed with respect to the validity of the sample.
6.3.2 Created Samples
In order to raise the bar of the test and better measure the attitude of
the systems under test to detect an unknown advanced threat, sample team
has contempt the creation of a new ad hoc advanced malware capable to get
“hands on keyboard” access to the infected machine.
Like other advanced threats, the created sample has been equipped with
some evasion techniques in order to better simulate the intent of the attacker
to bypass defences.
Particular care has been taken in order to not simply mimic or theoreti-
cally enable malicious behaviours, in fact the rouge software was programmed
to behave as a Trojan-Spyware by automatically log all the keys pressed to
the command and control server.
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6.4 Running Test: Malware Delivery and C2
According to the two step validation introduced in 6.3.1, a few hours
before test beginning samples have been re-collected and validated to make
sure they are still meaningful.
Malware delivery and C2 test have been split in two sequential phases:
the delivery detection phase where malicious samples are downloaded by an
internal host via HTTP channel, and the command and control detection
phase where samples have been run on the internal host independently from
delivery results. The chosen test type was one at time.
Test team has monitored defence tools’ consoles and assigned PASS judg-
ment in case of detection of malicious sample or no detection of benign sam-
ple, NA in case of lack of information due to components properties reported
by test-bed team, FAIL otherwise.
NGF APT-
DET-1
APT-
DET-2
APROXY SYSTEM-
1
SYSTEM-
2
Bot
PASS NA NA NA PASS PASS
Trojan-
Spyware
PASS NA NA NA PASS PASS
Downloader
PASS NA NA NA PASS PASS
Worm
FAIL PASS PASS FAIL PASS PASS
Trojan-
Backdoor
PASS NA NA NA PASS PASS
Ad hoc
Trojan-
Spyware
FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL
GrayWare
1
FAIL PASS PASS FAIL PASS PASS
Benign
Samples 1
PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS
Benign
Samples 2
PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS
Benign
Samples 3
PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS
Table 6.1: Pass/Fail/NA result of malware delivery phase
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NGF APT-
DET-1
APT-
DET-2
APROXY SYSTEM-
1
SYSTEM-
2
Bot
FAIL PASS FAIL FAIL PASS FAIL
Trojan-
Spyware
FAIL PASS FAIL FAIL PASS FAIL
Downloader
FAIL FAIL PASS FAIL FAIL PASS
Worm
FAIL PASS PASS FAIL PASS PASS
Trojan-
Backdoor
PASS NA NA PASS PASS PASS
Ad hoc
Trojan-
Spyware
FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL
GrayWare
1
FAIL FAIL PASS FAIL FAIL PASS
Benign
Samples 1
PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS
Benign
Samples 2
PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS
Benign
Samples 3
PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS
Table 6.2: Pass/Fail/NA result of command and control phase
6.5 Results
Tables 6.46.4 report the results of the malware delivery and command and
control sub-test showing which components have passed or failed the test.
With this information analysis team has formulated the following considera-
tion regards test results:
• SYSTEM-1 performs slightly better due to relevant contribution of
APT-DET-1 in detecting command and control communications.
• SYSTEM-1 and SYSTEM-2 have not detected the custom malware
which represent an unforeseen attack-tactic.
• Tested TA detection systems do not show issues related to false positive.
These consideration are adequate for providing useful advice to the buyer
of the test.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
Proper testing methodologies for modern defence tools is a key point in
the battle versus advanced cyber-attacks that are scourging IT infrastruc-
tures all around the world. Understand the effectiveness of adopted coun-
termeasures give precious feedback to both organizations and vendors, and
represent an indispensable requirement for increasing the awareness of mod-
ern threats and better evaluate risks and opportunities.
Literature and guidelines on testing methodologies available at the time
of writing does not cover sufficiently the peculiarities of targeted attacks, a
great amount of documents about the testing of security systems is malware
centric, leaving a gap between what is measured and what actually happens.
This work aims to provide indications and guidelines for preparing mean-
ingful test for security systems and defence tools with particular emphasis
on modern attacks: Targeted Attacks. Proposed methodology has been de-
signed to deal with the most important attack steps that characterize this
type of threat, it provides a schematic workflow, activities description and
team-oriented organization of the testing process.
A real-world test has been successfully conducted using methodology in-
troduced in this work providing precious feedbacks for better compare two
TA detection systems with emphasis on attacks that are really capable to
significantly damage organizations, showing the applicability of the provided
guideline and its effectiveness in filling part of the gap between what we
actually test and what we actually tackle.
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Appendix A
Clarifications
A.1 Developed Tools
During the preparements of the test reported in 6 several tools have
been developed like the Malicious Sample Scraper, sample upload automa-
tion scripts and the created malicious sample. These instruments cannot be
attached at this document due to their development context: this thesis was
developed during my internsiph and I was asked to avoid disclousure of these
tools.
A.2 Products and Test Results
Test reported in the case study has been setted up in the context of my
intership and test-bed was actually deployed in an important enterprise en-
vironment. Names of the products involved in this test have been explicitely
avoided due to the confidential nature of the test. However the purpose of
this document is not to compare products, it’s rather the definition and the
experimentation of a methodology for better fill the gap between what is
tested and what is actually tackled.
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